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Even if governments agree on equivalency of organic standards across countries,
consumers may still believe domestically produced organic foods are superior to imports.  We
simulated a partial equilibrium model of trade in organic wheat between the United States and
Germany to illustrate the welfare gains and losses associated with international harmonization of
organic standards.  Six cases were examined – no equivalency in standards (the status quo),
equivalency of standards with complete and incomplete import acceptance, exporters certifying
in importing country with complete and incomplete import acceptance, and exporters paying
educational costs, with incomplete import acceptance. Results demonstrate that importing
country consumers are better off if they are willing to accept imports as equivalent to
domestically produced organic foods.  Strategies to reduce resistance such as educational
programs or foreign certification add costs to production that reduce quantity traded and impose
welfare losses on exporting country producers and importing country consumers.
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Consumer Effects of Harmonizing International Standards
for Trade in Organic Foods
Luanne Lohr and Barry Krissoff
Worldwide markets for organic foods are expanding, with annual growth rates of 25 to 30
percent in the European Union (EU), the United States (US), and Japan for more than five years.
Using 1997 sales data and annual growth rates from the International Trade Centre (ITC 1999),
and assuming a linear trend, projected market size in 2010 will be at least $46 billion in the EU,
$45 billion in the US, and $11 billion in Japan.  As many as 20 to 30 percent of consumers
surveyed in Europe, North America, and Japan claim to purchase organic foods on a regular
basis (Lohr 1998a).  Yet, “organic” does not mean the same thing to all these consumers because
organic food production and processing standards are not harmonized across countries.
Certifiers of organic food production, processing, and handling use different rules according to
regulatory, philosophical, and technical goals.  This research compares the trade and welfare
implications of harmonizing international standards for organic food certification with the status
quo market response to differential standards.
We develop a partial equilibrium trade model to illustrate the gains and losses associated
with international harmonization of organic standards.  Market behavior is simulated under
realistic assumptions about the evolution of a harmonized standard to obtain welfare results for
comparison with the status quo market response to varying standards.  We identify the
conditions under which harmonization is beneficial to consumers and those under which it is
harmful, and use this information to suggest how proposed US standards will affect trade.
Current Status of International Harmonization
No single international regulation establishes uniform standards for organic certification
and no single agency or body is designated to accredit certifiers (ITC 1999).  Exported goods
must meet the production standards of the importing country, as determined by the competent
organic authority in that country, typically the national government body responsible for
regulating domestic certification.  Legal (federal, regional, state) standards supercede private
(farmer-based or for-profit) standards.  At least 100 regional or national standards have been
enacted worldwide, and numerous private sector standards exist as well (ITC 1999).  Inspection
is carried out by public or private entities to verify that organic production processes meet
standards.  Certification confirms that standards are met so that buyers can be certain of product
integrity.  Accreditation recognizes the competence of certifiers to conduct inspections and offer
certification.  There are 30 organic accreditation bodies worldwide (ITC 1999).
An exporting country may apply to have its standards approved across the board for
designated products, regions, or certifiers by the importing country or region.  If not granted
blanket equivalency, exporters must submit documents for contract-by-contract verification that
certification standards applied to the product are compatible with prevailing standards in the
importing country.  The contract-by-contract approach is cumbersome, and is associated with
high transaction costs, including occasional rejection of shipments due to perceived2
incompatibility of standards.  Exporters have evolved several certification alternatives to try to
reduce transaction costs.  These include using an independent local certifier accredited under
international certification process standards ISO/IEC Guide 65 or EU process standards EN
45011, using a local branch of an accredited international certifier, using local certifiers who
have partnered with accredited international entities, using an international certifier or an entity
in the importing country approved for third country certifications, and subcontracting to
processors or distributors certified in the importing country (ITC 1999).
Without national standards in place in the US, there has been substantial effort on the part
of private companies to develop certifier label recognition among importers and government
authorities in the importing countries.  This can reduce individual firm transactions costs by
increasing knowledge about the certification and establishing its comparability to the importing
country standards.  An unpublished telephone interview of US organic exporters and foreign
importers conducted by the University of Georgia in July and August 1999 assessed certifier
recognition in Europe and Japan.  Of the dozens of active certifiers in the US, only four for-profit
certifiers, two farmer-based non-profit certifiers, and two state government certifiers were
identified as having name recognition in foreign countries.  Individual producers contribute to
this awareness by providing information about the certification standards they adhere to
whenever they conduct a transaction.  Under uniform US standards, exporting firms will still
assume at least part of the cost of educating foreign buyers about US standards during their
transactions.
This situation has incited a call for harmonization of standards through international
accreditation of certifiers to reduce marketing costs.  Accreditation insures that certifiers hold
organic producers and processors to minimum industry standards.  This provides the means for
governmental and extra-governmental organizations to regulate organic processes without
monitoring every single producer or processor within their geopolitical boundaries.  By serving
as accreditors, the entities who have the power to control international trade can review other
countries’ standards and negotiate acceptable standards for equivalency.  Although a national
government may also serve as a certifer, the system of accreditation introduces flexibility in the
type of organization permitted to certify and the organic rules they apply to their clients or
members.
Some progress has been made toward unified accreditation in both the private and public
sectors.  All allow for variation in specific standards as long as standard-setting and inspection
guidelines are met.  The International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM) is
a private sector umbrella association established in 1972 to encourage organic agriculture and
trade (ITC 1999).  With more than 100 members representing national associations, certifiers,
traders and processors, IFOAM is the largest and most influential organization of its type (Lohr
1998a).  IFOAM’s Basic Standards of Organic Agriculture and Food Processing have served as
the framework for numerous certification programs and its accreditation program assesses
compliance with these standards.  In 1999, 13 certification bodies were accredited by IFOAM
with six more under review (ITC 1999).  In 2000, 14 IFOAM-accredited certification bodies,
including four private US certifiers, took the additional step of signing a multilateral agreement
to extend blanket equivalency to all other signees, boosting the international credibility of3
IFOAM accreditation (Ecology and Farming 2000).  The effectiveness of this agreement in
promoting harmonization is as yet unknown.
The IFOAM standards have been influential on work completed in 1999 by the Codex
Alimentarius Commission’s Committee on Food Labeling and Committee on Food Import and
Export Inspection and Certification Systems to develop international  guidelines for national
standards (ITC 1999; K. DiMatteo, personal communication).  Guidelines for crop production,
marketing, and labeling have been approved by the Commission, which will consider the
Committee’s recommended livestock guidelines in 2001 (K. DiMatteo, personal
communication). Codex is particularly concerned with preventing the use of national standards
as trade barriers.  While not envisioned as a basis for equivalency, these guidelines may be used
by the World Trade Organization in settling disputes.  An exporting country who adheres to
these guidelines would be in a stronger position to demand access to an importing country’s
markets, even if its own national standards are less strict.  These guidelines may result in
harmonized standards by influencing trade dispute arbitration.
The most widely recognized organization associated with accreditation is the
International Organization for Standardization, which promotes rationalization of standards to
facilitate trade, product development, and research cooperation.  ISO/IEC Guide 65 establishes
generic principles for certification bodies and has been adapted for organic accreditation by
IFOAM and Demeter, an international network of certifiers for biodynamic farming (ITC 1999).
The EU’s standardizing bodies have adapted ISO Guide 65 in EN 45011, their requirements for
certifying bodies.  Beginning in June 1999, all domestic and foreign certifiers approved by the
EU had to meet these rules.  In response to the needs of US exporters to Europe, the Meat
Grading and Certification Branch, under the US Department of Agriculture’s (USDA)
Agricultural Marketing Service, began accrediting US certifiers according to ISO Guide 65.  The
ISO standards are seen as a stopgap measure for equivalency in organic production as they do
not govern production methods, only production certification processes.
The United States moved closer to national accreditation with the posting of a final rule
for national organic standards in December 2000.  Once the final rule is implemented, the federal
government will accredit domestic and foreign certifiers selling product in the US and will have
standing to apply for blanket import approval in the EU. Although details of standards differ
across countries, international harmonization appears to be inevitable.
Impacts of Harmonization on Consumers
A single minimum standard can reduce consumers’ costs of obtaining information about
the production process, an otherwise unobservable characteristic.  Consumers, who pay
premiums from 20 to 200 percent for organics in most countries, are protected from fraudulent
assertions and mislabeled products (Michelson et al. 1999).  Reducing the information
asymmetry between seller and buyer should result in a gain in consumer welfare.  Yet, even fully
informed consumers may differ in their perceptions of quality.
This welfare improvement depends on credibility of certification, internalized by the
consumer as confidence in the organic label.  Michelson et al. (1999) argued that the certification4
label is a generic requirement for sale of a good as organic rather than a brand cue, so consumers
are not influenced by additional promotional expenditures to look for and purchase a particular
organic label.  There is almost no generic advertising to educate consumers about basic
production principles and advantages of consuming organic foods (Michelson et al. 1999).  As a
result, underlying confusion about the nature of organic products makes consumers more
dependent on labels as cues.  This alters the branding aspect of particular certifier labels.
Currently, in many countries, there is little competition by labels within a geographic market.  As
interregional and international trade expand the flow of organic foods, consumers are more likely
to see multiple certifications competing in the same product category in the same outlet.
Consumers faced with multiple certifications may revert to other signals for selecting goods,
such as looking for domestic labels in which they have more confidence.
If both the importing and exporting countries view each others’ certification as
equivalent, organic product flow is optimized and the good is treated as homogeneous with
respect to standards.  Legal equivalency agreed upon by governmental accreditors does not mean
that standards are identical, nor does it guarantee consumer acceptance of the legal designation.
Even if standards are identical, consumers and buyers in the importing country are likely to view
imports as subject to less stringent requirements, to be “less organic.”  To allow for flexibility in
local conditions, production standards per se will not be harmonized.  To the extent that
philosophical, technical or cost factors differ, standards will vary across countries.  It is in the
interest of beneficiaries of domestic production (farm organizations, trade groups, environmental
groups) to encourage perceptions of differential quality.  Given a preference for locally grown
foods that already exists in many countries (ITC 1999), consumers are likely to believe that
domestically produced organic foods are superior to imported foods in at least some attribute
dimensions.  At the extreme, consumers would reject imports altogether.
The relative difficulty of importing organics into a country is affected in large part by
these concerns over perceived or real differences in standards.  US respondents in the University
of Georgia survey previously mentioned stated that they experience a high degree of difficulty
importing to Austria, France, and Switzerland, and a moderate degree of difficulty for Germany
and Japan.  Since Germany, France, and Switzerland are three of the four largest markets in the
EU, and Japan is the second largest single-country market in the world behind the US (ITC 1999,
Wittenberg 2000), consumer perceptions in these countries are paramount to US exporters.
There are several studies suggesting that credibility of foreign certification is questioned
by consumers.  Japanese consumers are highly skeptical of imported organic products, with
consumer studies indicating that one reason for not purchasing these foods is that foreign
certifications are untrustworthy (Wittenberg 2000).   This perception is expected to be
exacerbated when Japanese national organic standards are implemented in 2001 (Wittenberg
2000).  EU consumers voice similar concerns.  Even though there is a single certification
requirement for crop production and processing in the EU (EC Regulation 2092/91),
administration and marketing are left to each country’s competent authority, no unified logo for
labeling products was designated until 2000, and stricter regulations may be required by
individual countries for domestic labels, which are most trusted by consumers.  Michelsen et al.
(1999) reported cases of refusal of traders to handle foreign product or refusal of certifying
bodies to permit entry of products from other countries, even when both the exporting and5
importing countries were in the European Union and subject to the same minimum organic
standards.  In those cases, there was concern about the erosion of domestic standards by
importation of foods produced under (perceived) less strict requirements, which might result in a
loss of consumer confidence.  Michelsen et al. (1999) stated that while unified certification is
necessary, it is not sufficient for market growth.  Many consumers will still view their country’s
standards as stricter and “more organic” unless marketing campaigns are successfully conducted
to contradict this perception.
In the importing country, harmonization to a minimum standard perceived to be less strict
than the domestic standard could reduce demand for imported organic food, since it would be
viewed as inferior.  Alternatively, demand for imports could increase if a two-tiered demand
develops, with lower-priced, (perceived) lower quality imports being purchased by consumers
who cannot afford foods that meet the stricter domestic standard but who want to participate in
the organic market.  Demand would then be segmented into import and domestic shares, with the
possibility of price variability across quality groups and nonequal market shares for imports and
domestically produced foods.  The imports would be perceived as of different, and poorer,
quality than domestically produced organic foods by some segment of the consumer population.
This share of organic buyers would refuse to purchase the imports at any price.  The remaining
share would be indifferent between imported and domestically produced organics.  They would
purchase the lower priced of the two products, which would be the imports, if the second premise
presented above holds.
With demand segmentation in the importing country, the slopes of the demand curves for
the two groups are different from each other unless the share of consumers in each group is the
same. Which slope is relatively steeper depends on whether a smaller percentage rejects or
accepts imports, since the original market demand curve is partitioned by dividing these
percentages into its slope.  In previous applications of this model by Tauer (1994) to bST and
non-bST milk and by Lohr (1998b) to three classes of eco-labeled foods, the percentages of
consumers requiring particular quality characteristics were determined empirically.
If legal equivalence is accepted by consumers, imports are treated as homogeneous in the
market.  Similarly, in countries that do not have national standards, there is no widespread basis
for judging the relative strictness of foreign and domestic rules, so discrimination against imports
is less likely.  Organic claims for imports into Canada and the US are verified by importers rather
than the government, if they are checked at all, because as of the end of 2000, neither country
had implemented national organic standards.  In Japan, importation was assessed by the
University of Georgia’s survey as moderately difficult in 1999, but is expected to be much more
difficult with the implementation of national standards in 2001 (Wittenberg 2000).  Whether
consumer acceptance of imports is less likely than consumer rejection in most industrialized
countries depends on perceptions of equivalency between domestic and exporting country
standards.  These perceptions may be influenced by exporter behavior as well as by government
action.
Consumers are aware that firms in the exporting country at least conform to the minimum
international standard, but not necessarily to stricter domestic standards in the importing country.
Firms attempting to capture foreign market share could incur additional costs of certifying with a6
foreign entity to assure consumers in that country of the quality of their product.  To avoid
excess cost, these firms might opt out of their domestic certification programs altogether, leaving
fewer domestic firms to share the fixed costs of certification and accreditation.  The result would
be a two-tiered supply in the exporting country segmented into domestic and export shares.
With supply segmentation of the type described, both the intercepts and the slopes of the
supply curves for the two groups are different from each other.  The market supply curve is
partitioned according to the foreign market share captured by exporters, with the resulting export
slope being steeper than the domestic supply slope if the foreign market share is less than 50
percent.  The market intercept is adjusted upward separately for each supply segment according
to the fixed cost of domestic certification (for domestic suppliers) and the cost of foreign
certification (for exporters).
A combination of segmented demand and segmented supply could occur if exporters
engaged in foreign certification, but consumers in that country still rejected the import as
inferior.  This could conceivably happen if consumers are aware of the country-of-origin and
distrust the foreign production system, even if domestic certification is granted.  Alternatively,
exporters could certify domestically and invest in educational programs to promote their
certification or product quality to foreign consumers.  Unless they already accept the imported
product as homogeneous with the domestically produced version, it is unlikely that all foreign
consumers would be convinced by such a campaign.  Some percentage of those foreign
consumers who would have rejected the certification outright will be convinced to buy the
product, according to some function of educational spending by the exporters.  This generates
segmented demand in the importing country.  Supply in the exporting country is partitioned
according to the foreign market share captured by exporters, as explained previously, and the
supply intercept for export supply is adjusted upward by the cost of educational spending. Again,
both segmented demand and segmented supply would result.
Simulating Consumer Welfare Effects
To examine the possible outcomes of harmonization as described in the last section and
the impacts on consumer welfare, we develop a concrete example of trade under varying
assumptions about perceived product homogeneity.  The autarky situation (no trade) is simulated
as a baseline of comparison for all trade scenarios.  In the current market environment,
perceptions of consumers in the importing country dictate acceptance of imports.  We consider
six cases.  The cases compared with the autarky baseline are summarized on Table 1 and
explained below.7
Table 1.  Summary of Scenarios Compared with the Autarky Baseline




























a Under the status quo, prior to promulgation of the Final Rule for National Organic Standards,
suppliers certify domestically, but equivalency cannot be granted due to lack of US government
regulations.
In Case 1, the exporting country standards are not granted equivalency by the importing
country.  Exporters incur additional transaction costs to access the import market.  This is the
status quo situation between the US and the EU. In Case 2, the importing country and exporting
country standards are perceived as equivalent, and the product traded is homogeneous.
 In Case 3, the exporting country’s standards are perceived as less stringent and the
product is no longer homogeneous.  Demand in the importing country is segmented so that
domestic demand is for a perceived higher quality good and import demand is for a lower quality
product.  The price differential between the two reflects in part the quality differentiation.  In
Case 4, supply in the exporting country is segmented into domestic and export supply shares.
Exporters certify with an entity in the importing country and opt out of domestic certification in
the exporting country.  The domestic share in the exporting country incurs higher fixed costs
because accreditation program costs are spread over fewer producers.   It is assumed that
consumers in the importing country are unable to distinguish imports from domestically
produced organics when both display the same certification label, and so treat them as
homogeneous.
Case 5 is the same as Case 4, except consumers are assumed to have information that
enables them to identify imports, which they treat as lower quality.  An example of such
information is country of origin labeling.  This results in two-tiered demand in the importing
country and two-tiered supply in the exporting country.  In Case 6, exporters certify with
domestic entities, but invest in educational programs to promote their country’s certification
process.  It is assumed that educational spending is less than 100 percent effective, but will
increase the percentage of consumers in the importing country who will accept the imports.
Demand is segmented in the importing country and supply is segmented in the exporting
country.8
The simulation method used was adapted from Tauer (1994) and Lohr (1998b).  Partial
equilibrium models of linear supply and demand were constructed for each case for the
importing and exporting countries.  Systems of equations representing the trade scenarios were
solved simultaneously using the nonlinear module of GAUSS￿ Version 2.2  (Aptech Systems,
Inc., 1997).  All demand and supply equations were set up in price-dependent form.
Each case is graphically presented, followed by a discussion of parameter values used for
the scenarios.  For all graphs in this section, the subscript m refers to the importing country and
the subscript x refers to the exporting country.  ES and ED refer to excess supply and excess
demand.  All vertical axes are prices and all horizontal axes are quantities.  The left graph is for
the exporting country and the right graph is for the importing country.  All cases are based on a
“large country” trade model, which is appropriate for the US, Japan, and the EU as a whole and
for most countries individually in the EU, since the largest organic markets are in these
countries.
Case 1 - Equivalency Not Granted (Status Quo)
If blanket equivalency is not granted to an exporting country, firms must negotiate
certification equivalency for each contract.  Figure 1 shows the extra cost incurred by the
exporting country modeled as a tax equivalent imposed by the importer. Prices differ in the
importing and exporting countries because the price creates a tax wedge.  The importing country
faces price P + tax while the exporter faces P - tax.  The dashed line shows the implication of the
excess costs.  Quantity exported is Qsx - Qdx, which is less than quantity of imports desired,
equal to Qdm - Qsm.  The extra transactions costs drive down domestic price in the exporting
country as they raise it in the importing country.
Case 2 – Equivalency Granted, Homogeneous Goods
The dotted line in Figure 1 shows the equilibrium at ED = ES.  Adjusting the quantities
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FIGURE 1.  Equivalence vs. No Equivalence Between Exporting and Importing
Countries9
results in Qsx - Qdx = Qdm - Qsm.  This case should generate the greatest welfare improvement
over autarky because there are no extra transactions costs.  A single price, P, prevails in both
countries and consumers in the importing country treat the imported good as identical to the
domestically produced version.
Case 3 – Equivalency Granted, Imports Rejected
In Figure 2, demand in the importing country is segmented into domestic (subscript d)
and import (subscript m) demand.  There are two equilibrium prices (Pmd and Pmm) and
quantities (Qmd and Qmm) determined by the domestic and import supply and demand curves.
The market is segmented by assuming that more than 50 percent of consumers in the importing
country refuse to buy imports due to perceived inferiority of the import good.  Dividing the
demand curve slope by this share gives Dmd, the domestic demand in the importing country.
The rest of demand in the importing country is  Dmm.
The domestic supply curve in the importing country is Smd.  Import supply is given by
ES, the excess supply curve generated from conditions in the exporting country.  The quantity
exported is Qsx - Qdx as before, and it is assumed all excess supply is sold in the importing
country at equilibrium price Pmm.  Domestic demand Dmd is more elastic than import demand
Dmm and domestic supply Smd is more inelastic than import supply, ES. Domestic price Pmd is
greater than import price Pmm as long as the share refusing to purchase imports at price Pmm is
greater than 50 percent.  Domestic quantity Qmd is greater than import quantity Qmm despite the
lower price of imports due to quality perceptions.
The concept of excess demand presupposes a homogeneous good in the importing
country where quantity supplied in that country is insufficient to meet quantity demanded and
imports are required to make up the difference.  In a trade situation with segmented demand in
the importing country, the quantity of imports demanded is not set by excess domestic demand
because imports and domestic production are heterogeneous to a segment of consumers. With
segmented demand, it is possible to establish different equilibrium prices and quantities because











FIGURE 2.  Imports Rejected, Segmented Import Demand10
placing the demand for the domestically produced good, Dmd, and the demand for the imported
good, Dmm, in the importing country on different graphs.
In Figure 2, the middle graph is necessary to know the total quantity exchanged in the
importing country.  Qmm from the middle graph must be added to Qmd from the right graph to
obtain the total.  In Figure 1, the total quantity exchanged can be assessed by looking only at the
graph for the importing country, for which Qsm is the domestically produced quantity consumed,
and Qdm-Qsm is the imported quantity consumed.  For the exporting country, the left graph in
Figure 2 is sufficient to determine both exports and domestic use, as it is in Figure 1.  In both
figures, domestically produced quantity consumed in the exporting country is Qdx and export
supply is Qsx-Qdx, which is equivalent to Qmm in Figure 2.  The middle graphs in Figures 1 and
2 show excess supply in the exporting country, but the information is redundant to the
calculations that can be made using only the information from the left graphs.
There is no producer surplus in the importing country associated with the ES curve since
these suppliers only sell domestically.  Suppliers in the exporting country obtain surplus
domestically and in the export market. The segmented demand curve has two components –
domestic demand Dmd shown in the right graph and import demand Dmm shown in the middle
graph, so consumer surpluses must be summed across the two markets to obtain consumer
surplus in the importing country.  Consumer surplus in the exporting country is obtained by the
usual calculations related to Dx.
Case 4 – Exporters Certify in Importing Country, Homogeneous Goods
In this situation, shown in Figure 3, the exporting country is assumed to have segmented
supply, with export suppliers differentiated from domestic suppliers.  Unlike Case 3, no set share
of supply is assumed to be exported.  Instead, the model exploits the cost increasing effects of
the segregated domestic and international certification to solve for the share of production that is
exported.  Export supply is found by dividing the export share into the slope coefficient, and
domestic supply is obtained by dividing one minus the share into the slope.  Exporters certify
with an entity in the importing country and do not share the domestic organic program costs.
Suppliers who remain in the domestic market incur higher fixed costs of accreditation and
certification because exporters have opted out of the domestic program. If this strategy is
successful, imports will be indistinguishable by certification label from domestically produced
organics.  Consumers in the importing country will treat both as homogeneous and thus, only one
demand curve exists in the importing country.
The domestic demand curve in the exporting country is Dxd. The export demand curve is
the same as the excess demand curve, ED, generated by conditions in the importing country.
The quantity exported is Qxx, which is equivalent to Qdm – Qsm in the importing country, sold
at equilibrium price, Pxx.  Domestic supply, Sxd, is more elastic than export supply, Sxx, and
domestic demand Dxd is more inelastic than export demand, ED.  The domestic supply curve in
the exporting country shifts by the amount of the accreditation cost increase.  The export supply
curve, Sxx, shifts up by the additional cost, if any, of certifying in the importing country.
Domestic equilibrium quantity, Qxd, is greater than export quantity, Qxx, and domestic price,
Pxd, is greater than export price, Pxx, if the accreditation cost increase is less than the cost11
increase for certifying abroad and the share of supply exported is less than the share for domestic
consumption.
In a trade situation with segmented supply in the exporting country, the quantity of
exports supplied is not set by excess domestic supply because exports and domestic production
are segmented by costs.  Similar to segmented demand, it is possible to establish different
equilibrium prices and quantities because producers who export incur different costs from those
who produce for domestic market.  In this paper, these costs were assumed to be related to
certification and education, as shown on Table 1.  This is shown graphically by placing the
supply for the domestically produced good, Sxd, and the supply for the exported good, Sxx, in
the exporting country on different graphs.
In Figure 3, the middle graph is necessary to know the total quantity exchanged in the
exporting country.  Qxx from the middle graph must be added to Qxd from the left graph to
obtain the total.  In Figure 1, the total quantity exchanged can be assessed by looking only at the
graph for the exporting country, for which Qsx is the domestically produced quantity supplied,
and Qsx-Qdx is the exported quantity.  In Figure 3, domestically produced quantity consumed in
the importing country is Qdm and import demand is Qdm-Qsm, which is equivalent to Qxx.  For
the importing country, the right graph in Figure 3 is sufficient to determine both imports and
consumption of domestically produced goods, as it is in Figure 1.  In both figures, domestically
produced quantity consumed in the importing country is Qdm and import demand is Qdm-Qsm,
which is equivalent to Qxx in Figure 3.  The middle graphs in Figures 1 and 3 show excess
demand in the importing country, but the information is redundant to the calculations that can be
made using only the information from the right graphs.
There is no consumer surplus in the exporting country associated with the ED curve
because these consumers purchase only domestically produced organics.  Consumers in the
importing country obtain surplus domestically and from the import market.  The segmented
supply curve has two components – domestic supply Sxd shown in the left graph and export
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FIGURE 3.  Exporters Certify in Importing Country, Homogeneous Good12
obtain producer surplus in the exporting country.  Producer surplus in the importing country is
based on the domestic supply curve Sm.
Case 5 – Exporters Certify in Importing Country, Imports Rejected
This case has the same assumptions as Case 4 – exporters certify in the importing country
leaving fewer domestic suppliers to share organic accreditation program costs and thus
increasing domestic costs.   However, in Case 5, it is assumed that additional information is
available to consumers in the importing country so that they can identify which organic products
are imported and which are domestically produced.  As in Case 3, the imports are rejected by
some share of consumers.  Figure 4 shows this situation.
Both supply in the exporting country and demand in the importing country are
segmented.  There are now three equilibrium prices and quantities, one each in the domestic
markets of the exporting and importing countries and one for the export supply and import
demand curves.  As in Case 4, the share exported is divided into the supply curve in the
exporting country to segment supply and the share who refuse to buy imports is divided into the
demand curve in the importing country to segment demand.  The export supply curve, Sxx, and
the import demand curve, Dmm, are more inelastic than their respective domestic supply and
demand curves.
The share of consumers who refuse imports is set, as in Case 3, and the share of supply
exported is determined by elasticities and equilibrium conditions, as in Case 4.  The import share
sets the upper limit on international trade, since it is a fixed value.  Both domestic prices, Pmd
and Pxd, are greater than the trade price, Pxx = Pmm, and both domestic quantities, Qxd and
Qmd, are greater than the quantity traded, Qxx = Qmm.  This result requires that trade represent
less than 50 percent of the share of total supply in the exporting country and total demand in the
importing country.  Also, for this result, the cost of certifying in the importing country must be
greater than the additional cost of accreditation to domestic suppliers in the exporting country.
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FIGURE 4.  Exporters Certify in Importing Country, Imports Rejected13
associated with import demand, Dmm, for reasons given in Cases 3 and 4.  Other welfare effects
are calculated as usual.
Case 6 – Exporters Pay Education Costs, Incomplete Import Acceptance
In Case 6, exporters certify domestically, so cost differentials from Cases 4 and 5
between domestic and export suppliers in the export country are eliminated.  However, exporters
invest in education of consumers in the importing country about the quality of their products and
certification with the aim of convincing consumers to accept imports.  The efficiency of
educational spending is assumed to be less than 100 percent, so that the share who reject imports
is less than in Cases 3 and 5, but is not zero.  This scenario is similar to that in Figure 4, except
that the intercept for the domestic supply curve in the exporting country begins at the origin,
there being no additional accreditation costs incurred.  The intercept for the export supply curve
shifts upward by the amount of educational spending.
Demand in the importing country and supply in the exporting country are both
segmented, as in Case 5.  In the exporting country, the supply curve is segmented as it was in
Cases 4 and 5.  In the importing country, the slope of the demand curve is divided by the share of
consumers who refuse to buy imports to get domestic demand and by one minus this share to get
import demand. The share refusing to buy imports was not set exogenously.  Spending as a
percentage of price is multiplied by educational efficiency, defined as the percentage increase in
share buying imports per percent of educational spending, and was subtracted from the default
share refusing to buy imports.  Thus, the share of imports demanded was dependent on decisions
made by exporters.  Consumer surplus does not exist for the export supply curve, nor producer
surplus for the import demand curve, but all other welfare effects are calculated as usual using
the trade price, Pxx = Pmm, and quantity, Qxx = Qmm, along with domestic demand and supply
curves in each country.
The results that actually occur in the market depend on elasticities of demand, prices for
imported and domestic organics, and costs of certification and accreditation.  All the situations
described are possible for the US under current conditions.  Since the US will probably
implement its national standards in 2001, the status quo scenario (Case 1) will not maintain.
Case 2 is the least likely to result across all countries to which the US exports organic foods,
since consumer acceptance of imports varies.  Case 3 represents the initial situation that is likely
following implementation of US standards.  Cases 4 and 6 are responses to rejection of US
exports certified domestically, with Case 4 being the more optimistic in terms of foreign
consumer response.  Case 5 would occur if foreign consumers distrust their own certification
programs.  This is a possible result with fragmented certification, where there are multiple
certifiers in the country and none are dominant enough to be credible throughout.  Examples
include Germany, with more than 50 certifiers, Austria, with 22 certifiers, and Italy, with eight
control bodies.  Also, Case 5 might result if consumers are aware of the origin of the import, and
despite certification in their own country, distrust the production method and reject the import.14
Application of the Trade Model
The model was simulated for a two-country partial equilibrium with the United States
exporting wheat to Germany.  The US is a major producer of organic wheat, calculated at
101,806 metric tons, based on 1997 acreage from Greene (2000) and yield from the Organic
Farming Research Foundation (OFRF) (1999).  Germany is the largest single market for organic
food products outside the US and a substantial producer of organic wheat in Europe.  Domestic
production was calculated at 59,880 metric tons, based on 1995 arable acreage from Foster and
Lampkin (1999), percent allocated to wheat, and yield per hectare from Offerman and Nieberg
(2000).  Prices differed markedly between the countries, with 1997 farm price for US organic
wheat calculated at $231.48 per metric ton, based on per bushel price from OFRF (1999).
German farm price in 1995 was calculated at $485.40 per metric ton, based on per ton price in
ecus from Offerman and Nieberg (2000).
These prices and quantities, along with elasticities of supply and demand, were used to
obtain the intercepts and slopes for the demand and supply curves.  The demand elasticity for
wheat in the US was assumed to be -0.0255, consistent with the own-price elasticity for
conventionally grown wheat (Barnes and Shields 1998).  This is reasonable since organic
processors and consumers are unlikely to have more flexibility in substituting other grains for
wheat than do conventional processors and consumers.  While availability of substitutes in terms
of quantity is probably more limited for organic processors, there is no solid information on
which to choose a different elasticity.  The German demand elasticity for wheat also was
assumed to be -0.0255.
Both US and German supply elasticities were set at 1.00.  This forces the supply curve
through the origin.  It is reasonable to examine this case since both US and German farmers sell
some portion of certified organic wheat through conventional market channels.  For German
farmers, about 15 percent of wheat does not enter the organic market and so fails to return the
expected price premium (Michelson et al. 1999).  In the US, about 20 percent of organic wheat
acreage is sold as conventional (OFRF 1999).   This flexibility in marketing permits organic
growers to take advantage of price-cost differentials, timing of market demand and other factors
that should increase responsiveness to price changes.  The slopes and intercepts are presented in
Table 2.
TABLE 2.  Demand and Supply Equations
Intercept Slope
United States
Supply  0.00 0.0023
Demand 9309.18 -0.0892
Germany
Supply  0.00 0.0081
Demand 19520.64 -0.3179
The market curves represented in Table 2 assume there is no substitution of conventional
for organic wheat in either demand or supply.  Although end consumers (households) may15
choose conventional wheat products when organic prices increase, processors and other
intermediaries modeled here cannot because EU regulations require that 95 percent of the
ingredients of a product labeled “organic” be of certified origin (EU Council Regulation
2092/91).  The US standards also stipulate this level of organic content.  On the supply side, at
least one year for the transition period is required in the EU countries and a three-year transition
period is required in the US rules, so farmers lose certification and must start over if they farm
the land using conventional practices.
Other parameters were specified for the individual cases.  Available information on
market conditions was used to generate parameters; and in all cases, the assumed values are
conservative.  In Case 1, transaction cost was assumed to be five percent of equilibrium price.  In
Cases 3 and 5, the share of German domestic market assumed to refuse to buy US imports was
80 percent, which is a conservative estimate.  Cereals rank as the most important organic food
group in the country, with organic holding 3.4 percent of total market share for cereals
(Michelson et al. 1999).  Organic bakeries, the main consumers of wheat, account for 8 percent
of the total organic market, worth DM 250 million, and an estimated DM 3 million is imported
(ITC 1999).  Another DM 17 million worth of raw materials is imported for production of pasta
and cereals.  German consumers are considered among the most critical in the EU and local
sourcing is an important factor in their purchase decisions (ITC 1999).  Importers must work
extremely hard to meet these discerning standards and satisfy the German consumer.
In Cases 4 and 5, the accreditation cost increase to domestic suppliers was assumed to be
0.5 percent of equilibrium price, based on program costs and number of domestic producers
estimated by the USDA.  The foreign certification cost increase to export suppliers was assumed
to be 1.5 percent of domestic US certification costs, based on costs in Germany and the US
(Offerman and Nieberg 2000).  In Case 6, educational spending was assumed to be 5 percent of
equilibrium price and educational efficiency was assumed to be 75 percent.  Previous research by
Lohr (1998b) suggested that these are realistic values for domestic education programs about
eco-labels in the US, but they probably overstate the cost-effectiveness of a foreign education
program given the strength of German attitudes.
Price and quantity equilibria for the six scenarios are shown in Table 3.  The six cases
were compared to autarky in terms of consumer, producer and net surpluses, which are shown in
Table 4.  The results were consistent with the graphical analyses presented.  In all cases, US
consumers were made worse off while German consumers gained.  Net surpluses were all
positive, with Germany gaining three to twelve times as much as the US from trade.  Quantity
traded and US and German net surpluses were highest when the import good was treated as
homogeneous with domestically produced organic wheat in Germany (Cases 2 and 4).  US
consumers lost the most in these cases due to domestic price increases over autarky of 24.1
percent for Case 2 and 25.1 percent for Case 4.
The best situation for the US (Case 2) gave a net surplus of $697,670.  In this case,
25,086 metric tons was exported, and domestic quantity demanded was 101,183 metric tons, 0.6
percent lower than under autarky.  Price was 24 percent higher for US consumers with trade.
The best result for Germany (Case 4) gave a net surplus of $2,501,082.  With 25,156 metric tons
imported, and domestic quantity supplied at 48,144 metric tons, total German consumption was16
TABLE 3.  Price and Quantity Equilibria Under Trade Scenarios 
a
Price Domestic Quantity 
b  Quantity Traded
 c
($/mt) (metric tons) (metric tons)
CASE 1.  Equivalency not granted (status quo)
United States 272.75 101,345 18,612
  Germany 301.46 37,189 -18,612 
d
CASE 2.  Equivalency granted, homogeneous goods
United States 287.10 101,183 25,086
Germany 287.10 35,418 -25,086
CASE 3.  Equivalency granted, imports rejected
United States 258.35 101,505 12,119
Germany – Imports 258.35 -12,119
Germany – Domestic 390.26 48,144
CASE 4. Exporters certify in importing country, homogeneous goods
United States – Exports 286.55 25,156
United States – Domestic 289.40 101,157
Germany 286.55 35,350  -25,156
CASE 5. Exporters certify in importing country, imports rejected
United States – Exports 255.15 12,121
United States - Domestic 260.28 101,483
Germany - Imports 255.15 -12,121
Germany – Domestic 390.26 48,144
CASE 6. Exporters pay education costs, incomplete import acceptance
United States – Exports 276.93 14,377
United States - Domestic 263.09 101,452
Germany - Imports 276.93 -14,377
Germany – Domestic 372.31 45,930
a Under autarky, the U.S. equilibrium price for organic wheat was $231.38 per metric ton and
quantity was 101,806 metric tons.  In Germany, equilibrium price was $485.40 per metric ton
and quantity was 59,881 metric tons.
b Domestic quantity demanded for U.S., domestic quantity supplied for Germany.
c Quantity traded is positive for the exporting country and negative for the importing country.
When there is a single price for domestic and imported or exported quantity, quantity traded
represents excess demand or excess supply for that country.
d Excess demand in Germany was 4,658 metric tons.17
TABLE 4.  Welfare Changes Compared to Autarky
Producer Consumer Net Surplus
CASE 1.  Equivalency not granted (status quo)
United States 4,575,655 -4,191,632 384,022
  Germany -8,927,537 11,067,710 2,140,173
CASE 2.  Equivalency granted, homogeneous goods
United States 6,342,950 -5,645,280 697,670
Germany -9,448,681 11,935,937 2,487,256
CASE 3.  Equivalency granted, imports rejected 
a
United States 2,894,338 -2,731,518 162,820
Germany -5,138,678 7,304,343 2,165,665
CASE 4. Exporters certify in importing country, homogeneous goods 
b
United States 6,560,908 -5,878,061 682,847
Germany  -9,468,156 11,969,238  2,501,082
CASE 5. Exporters certify in importing country, imports rejected 
c
United States 3,050,006 -2,927,191 122,815
Germany -5,138,679 7,343,136 2,204,458
CASE 6. Exporters pay education costs, incomplete import acceptance 
d
United States 3,636,148 -3,211,957 424,190
Germany -5,982,738 8,159,588 2,176,850
a  Share of German domestic market assumed to refuse to buy imports was 80%.
b  Share of exporting country supply traded was 20.21%.
c   Share of exporting country supply traded was 10.95%.
d  Share of exporting country supply traded was 12.32%.
73,300 metric tons, 22 percent higher than without trade.  Price decreased by 41 percent from the
autarky case.
The status quo situation described in Case 1 resulted in a net surplus for the US that was
only 55 percent of the surplus in Case 2.  The net surplus for Germany was 86 percent of the best
result described in Case 4.  As a two-country model, the simulation results overstated the true
trade conditions.  The actual quantity of all cereals imported into Germany in 1997-1998 was
estimated at 25,000 metric tons while the simulated quantity for organic wheat imported from the
US was 18,612 metric tons (Michelson et al. 1999).  France, Canada, Italy, Australia, the Czech
Republic, and Hungary also export cereals to Germany, with total quantity imported estimated at
10 percent of the domestic organic market share (Michelson et al.  1999).  The simulated share of
imports was 33 percent of domestic quantity demanded.  Of key importance in the simulation
results was the price effect in Germany, which even with the extra transaction cost due to lack of
equivalency reduced the German domestic price by 38 percent.  Maintaining a significant price18
differential with an importing country’s domestic price improves the attractiveness of US
exports, even if not granted full equivalency by the importing country.
In both cases (Cases 3 and 5) where a large percentage refused to accept the imports,
gains were lower for the US.  The extra costs to both domestic and export suppliers in Case 5
resulted in only $122,815 net surplus to the US and the lowest price for US exports at $255.15
per metric ton, 10 percent higher than autarky.  In Case 3, net surplus was $162,820, at price
$258.35. These cases resulted in the smallest loss to US consumers, as domestic equilibrium
quantity was greater than for the other scenarios. US consumers are better off if the differential
between domestic US and German prices is large, but the differential between US domestic and
export prices is small.  Scenarios 3 and 5 generated intermediate surplus values for Germany, but
the smallest quantities traded, at 12,119 metric tons for Case 3 and 12,121 metric tons with Case
5.
The low export-import prices were a reflection of German unwillingness to buy imports
that is built into the scenarios.  With a higher level of resistance, import prices would be lower
and domestic prices higher as autarky is approached.  Erosion of this resistance would move
prices toward the cases in which imports are viewed as homogeneous with domestically
produced goods, with attendant benefits to US producers and negative impacts on US consumers.
Case 6 gave net surplus for the US intermediate to the other cases, at $424,190, and
produced an intermediate surplus result for Germany, at $2,176,850 improving on the status quo
by 10 percent for the US and 2 percent for Germany.  This was the only case in which US
domestic price was below both the trade price and the Germany domestic price.  Educational
spending exerted downward pressure on US domestic price and educational spending efficiency
raised the trade price.  As either or both of these increase, the effect would be magnified.  If costs
of education are borne by the government, exports would be favored even more.
The last scenario is the most complicated in terms of behavioral effects on market
equilibrium.  The share of Germans who will not buy US organic wheat declines if either
spending increases or efficiency increases, but the effects are not the same.  The equilibria are
related via the slopes for German demand curves due to share imported (which depends on
spending and efficiency), the shift in the US export supply curve intercept due to education cost,
the slopes of US supply curves due to shares exported (which is free to vary in this scenario) as
explained in the case description.  Thus, the results are not straightforward where there is two-
tiered demand in the import country and two-tiered supply in the export country.
Sensitivity analyses conducted on the efficiency of education and educational spending
parameters revealed that increased educational spending by US exporters, without increased
efficiency, drives up the trade price, depresses the German domestic price, and increases the US
domestic price.  An educational efficiency gain magnifies the effect of a spending increase.  The
trade price rises higher, as does the US domestic price, but the German domestic price declines.
The relative effects on slopes and intercepts of the demand and supply curves is such that the gap
between German domestic and import prices becomes smaller, and the gap between US domestic
and export prices becomes greater.  As a result, the export share of US supply increases as more
Germans perceive the import as of equal quality with domestically produced wheat.19
Most of the results presented are subject to the parameters used to simulate the models.
While realistic, conservative values were selected for these parameters.  Different values could
alter the relative rankings of the scenarios on the basis of surpluses.  Of particular importance is
the treatment of consumer resistance to imports in Germany.  The status quo is usually
considered a worst case situation by the industry due to the cumbersome transactions, but in the
simulations here, Case 1 implicitly assumed that German consumers would buy all the product
offered at the higher “taxed” price.   Exactly because of the extra costs incurred under the status
quo system, care is usually taken to insure that the contracts are fulfilled and delivery of product
accepted, so the resistance to imports may be masked.  Harmonization may generate a false sense
of security among exporters, who will encounter lower transactions costs but revealed resistance
to their products from consumers in the importing country.
Conclusions
From the example provided for organic wheat trade between the US and Germany,
several conclusions may be drawn.  The status quo situation  is not the best for either country.
The US organic industry and the USDA are responding appropriately by developing
accreditation standards that will permit the US to apply for EU equivalency.   The status quo
situation imposes extra transactions costs on exporters whose certification is not recognized with
full equivalency in the importing country.  While trade does occur, there is excess demand in the
importing country, which in the real world will be met by US competitors.
German consumers would be better off if they were not so discriminating in their
preferences for domestically produced wheat.  However, uncertainty and concern about food
safety and fragmentation in German and US certification authorities are likely to perpetuate this
differentiation on the part of consumers.  Certification label branding is likely to evolve along
with harmonization of standards.  Consumers confronted with a multiplicity of organic labels
will look for the familiar, which typically will be a domestic label.  Depending on how distrustful
they are of foreign certification, some consumers may continue to refuse imported organic foods.
There are intangible gains to offering consumers greater choice, especially if the market is
segmented into heterogeneous domestic production and imports.  Consumers in the importing
country who could not otherwise afford organic foods, can buy imports because the import price
is forced down.
As long as organic production, processing, and handling requirements are not identical
across countries, some consumers will still view their country’s standards as stricter and “more
organic.”  Certification in the importing country offers a second-best solution to US producers
provided that no other information, such as country of origin labeling, undermines the
camouflage of the domestic label.  To the extent that costs of foreign certification are higher than
US certification, US producers will incur an extra expense if they have to use this method of
market entry.
Harmonization of accreditation standards alone is not sufficient to guarantee welfare
maximization in international organic trade.  If consumers do not accept the equivalency of
imported and domestically produced organic foods, welfare gains cannot be maximized.20
Reassuring foreign consumers of US certification quality and maintaining cost-competitiveness
are important factors in international marketing.  Consumer perceptions of product homogeneity
are critical whether developed through educational programs or foreign certification. The US
government conducts trade fairs to educate foreign buyers about US organic products.  Results
here suggest that domestic producers may not gain significantly from education efforts, if
domestic consumers in the importing country are resistant to imports.  The greatest welfare gains
occur if equivalency is accepted, whether or not exporters certify domestically or in the
importing country (Cases 2 and 4).  In the absence of consumer acceptance, welfare
improvements over the status quo are not significant for consumers in the importing country.
For US producers, surplus gains compared with autarky may actually be less if imports are
rejected than the situation under the status quo without equivalency.
Currently, organic trade shows are conducted by the US government only for purposes of
product introduction.  This de facto leads to a discussion between US vendors and foreign buyers
of the organic standards under which the product was certified  Whether or not the US
government provides educational programs about US organic standards, firms will continue to
promote their products, and of necessity, to educate about the standards to which their products
conform.  The organic industry has begun to develop export market assessments using a grant
from FAS in 2000 under the Export Market Assistance Program.  This is a step toward
identifying reasons for resistance to US organic products and ways to overcome consumer
resistance in importing countries.
International trade in organics could benefit both US consumers and producers. The
welfare effects of importing into the US should be explored.  By simulating results for other
countries and other crops, a view of the US organic consumer’s overall position may be
developed and more general conclusions may be drawn.
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